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erlewine’s monograph Monotheism and Tolerance. Recovering a Religion 
of Reason offers a  plea for the religious philosophies of three of the 
foremost representatives of what the author terms the ‘enlightenment 
religion of reason trajectory’. two of them, moses mendelssohn and 
Hermann Cohen, are Jewish, one, Immanuel Kant, Christian. The three 
authors examined, the author holds, put forth an account of religion that 
may help to reconcile modern religious pluralism and the self-conception 
of monotheistic religion, including its belief in historical revelation and 
election, without the latter having to abandon its distinct identity. 
In his introduction, erlewine gives an in-depth analysis of the 
precarious connection between monotheistic faiths and violence, with 
which contemporary critics of religion, notably Jan Assmann, have 
charged the three Abrahamic religions. Following Assmann and others, 
erlewine reveals the intolerance and proneness to violence inherent 
in monotheism to be rooted in its highly agonistic “dynamic between 
particularity and universality, wherein”, the author proceeds to explain, 
“a  particular community is imbued with universal significance, and as 
a  result is brought into conflict with all other particular communities, 
which lack this universal significance” (p. 10). Thus, in monotheistic 
faith, a particular historical community, entrusted with divine revelation, 
is tasked by God with spreading a message of universal significance with 
the eschaton at the end of salvation history bringing about the hoped-for 
conversion of all mankind. moreover, the message revealed bears upon 
the metaphysical telos of man’s very nature so that the other outside the 
divinely-privileged community is bound to fall short of human nature as 
such. Worse still, as well as missing the aim intrinsic to her nature, the 
religious other comes to be seen as positively defying divine providence. 
However, while there is no denying its proneness to violence, the dialectic 
between particularity and universality is so essential to the discursive 
structure of scriptural universalism that modern theories of religious 
pluralism, which seek to remedy the evident potential of violence intrinsic 
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to Abrahamic monotheism by rejecting the primacy of any one religion, 
fail to offer viable alternatives for the faithful. According to erlewine, it 
is the chief merit of the three thinkers he sets out to discuss that they all 
espouse enlightened philosophies of religion while also – with varying 
degrees of success – preserving both the logic of elective monotheism 
and the concomitant intolerance of the religious other. However, theirs 
is shown to be an intolerance that shuns violence both on the conceptual 
and physical level with the respect for the humanity in the person being 
the overriding aim of their enlightenment religious philosophy. 
Integrating the conflicting notions of the election of the Jews and 
cultural equality into a  first draft of enlightenment rational theology, 
Jewish philosopher moses mendelssohn, whose thought has been 
unduly neglected in the past, marks the beginning of the religion of 
reason trajectory. Contrary to those strands in modern mendelssohn 
scholarship that pass over the election of the Jewish people as peripheral 
to his systematic philosophy, the author points out that the attempt to 
reconcile Jewish elective monotheism and universal rational religion 
is, in fact, at the fore of the philosopher’s mature religious thought. In 
accordance with his perfection, mendelssohn’s God cannot but have 
created the best possible world, within which man, as a rational being, 
takes pride of place. The only being endowed with moral freedom and 
the ability to strive for individual perfection, man as such is of infinite 
worth. As a consequence, mendelssohn is aghast at the notion of eternal 
damnation which he deems incompatible with a  perfect God who, he 
avers, is unwilling ever to sacrifice the infinite value attaching to a rational 
being. It is for the sake of his infinite worth as well that man is entitled 
to believe in an afterlife in which he may continue his perpetual striving. 
Significantly, mendelssohn is keenly aware of the blatant contradiction 
between his vision of rational universalism and his own inherited elective 
monotheism. Hence, he rules out revelation as the sole means to salvation, 
insisting that the eternal truths of rational religion, to which man is 
privy by his capacity of reason alone, is sufficient to achieve the telos of 
individual perfection. Nevertheless, mendelssohn, despite his outspoken 
rational universalism, is unwilling to part with the pre-eminence of 
Jewish monotheism in favour of a  position of religious pluralism and 
relativism akin to John Hick’s. Instead, he seeks to preserve the dialectic 
of universality and particularity so crucial to elective monotheism by 
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introducing into his account of rational religion the concept of idolatry. 
While lacking in systematic coherence, mendelssohn’s notion of idolatry 
serves as an umbrella term for all kinds of aberrations from rational 
religion both in philosophy and theology. Significantly, it is with regard 
to his day’s Christianity, the prime example of irrational depravations in 
religion, that mendelssohn elaborates his key concept. Christianity, for 
mendelssohn, is a “living anachronism” (p. 54) evidencing the dangers 
resulting from scriptural universalism that, lacking rational correction, 
is at odds with the early modern ideal of tolerant egalitarianism. Positing 
belief in Christ as the sine qua non of salvation, Christianity misconstrues 
the arbitrary revelation of an unfathomable deity as the only means to 
attain salvation. Hence, the Christian God, conceived along the lines of 
scriptural voluntarism, emerges as a gruesome despot who, meting out 
grace according to his inscrutable counsels, denies man the due value 
which rational religion bestows upon him as a moral being: The dogma 
of original sin and the eternal damnation it entails robs the vast majority 
of mankind of any worth whatsoever. Conversely, Judaism is deemed 
the historical “emissary of reason” (p. 60). Pending the eschatological 
conversion of the whole of mankind to their original religion of reason, 
the Jews, entrusted with a special revelation, are called upon to witness 
to the religion of reason in a world that is still haunted by the spectre of 
idolatrous irrationalism. by practicing the rites prescribed by Halakha, 
mendelssohn’s chief example of Jewish revelation, Israel serves as 
a  priestly nation reminding others of the frequently-forgotten religion 
of reason from which they have strayed. However, it is here that the gap 
between elective monotheism and rational theology becomes apparent, 
as mendelssohn fails to provide any systematic whys and wherefores of 
Halakha serving a vital function within rational theology. In fact, both 
God’s election of the Jews and his special revelation of Halakha stem from 
his inscrutable will, thus proving an unenlightened remnant of scriptural 
universalism that co-exists somewhat uneasily with mendelssohn’s 
rational theology and cultural egalitarianism. In the end, mendelssohn, 
for all his outspoken religious rationalism, acquiesces in commending 
the fate of a largely idolatrous world to the incomprehensible counsels of 
the deity of Holy Writ, viewing Jewish election as only loosely, if at all, 
linked with the eventual triumph of enlightenment religion.
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Famously, Kant’s historic attempt at a  Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone translates Christian religion and the teaching of Christ, the 
supreme moral philosopher, into rational ethics. With theoretical reason 
bereft of its access to God in principle, practical reason alone may lay 
legitimate claim to knowledge about the divine. Avoiding mendelssohn’s 
rather inconclusive co-existence of rational and scriptural universalism, 
Kant is unequivocal in his rejection of the unfathomable deity of the 
biblical tradition. moreover, not only is scriptural universalism, which, 
in Kant’s account, vainly purports to offer both theoretical insight into 
and extra-ethical ways to attain to the divine, stripped of its religious 
legitimacy, but also deemed an obstacle to the practical religion of 
pure reason. Indeed, in his scathing criticism, Kant charges traditional 
religion with being subject to radical evil, as it posits self-love and the 
striving for individual happiness rather than perfection and disinterested 
love for mankind as the supreme maxim of man’s action. Thus, man, 
instead of undertaking the arduous task of moral self-reform, is tempted 
into preferring to seek happiness by pandering to the whims of a divine 
despot. Scriptural religions, moreover, can be seen to be driven by 
a  misguided universalism, as they fulfil their allegedly divine duty to 
spread their message. Their attempt, however, is doomed from the 
beginning, as arbitrary revelation, upon which their claim to universality 
is based, can never hope to engender a universal consensus. In the end, 
as is shown by ample historical evidence, it is only by resorting to violent 
means that scriptural religions can hope to enforce their alleged truth. 
Thus, Kant, surprisingly, exposes the traditional monotheistic creeds as 
subverting their very raison d’être, i.e. the unity of mankind in pursuing 
the one telos of the ethical commonwealth. At the heart of Kant’s ethics of 
autonomy, as erlewine shows, lies a social ideal that is conditional upon 
the perspective of moral universality replacing that of eudaimonistic 
particularity. In keeping with his rational theology, Kant’s ethical 
commonwealth, recognizing man’s finitude and utter ignorance of the 
divine, consists in man’s common moral striving to overcome radical 
evil and unsocial sociability. This effort is necessarily a collective one, as 
man must positively engage with the other in joint reflection and mutual 
critique in order to achieve the highest aim of practical reason: “Kant’s new 
anthropocentric, anti-foundationalist conception of reason”, concludes 
the author, “is public in nature, and rooted in discourse rather than the 
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dogmatic algorithms of (non-critical) rationalist metaphysics” (p. 123). 
In so doing, it certainly overcomes the violent intolerance inherent to 
elective monotheism, while still retaining some of its key notions such as 
its missionary effort in salvation history and its eschatological fulfilment 
in the kingdom of God. Nevertheless, in the end, Kant’s concept appears 
flawed on numerous grounds: For one thing, Kant vacillates about key 
notions of Christian faith which he sets out to translate into pure practical 
reason. Thus, while rejecting the idea of man’s original sinfulness as 
a  contradiction in terms, his notion of radical evil, which, by denying 
the moral law its due primacy, mars man’s every maxim, comes so close 
to it as to be virtually indistinguishable from it. For another, Kant’s 
ethico-theology, while seeking to end religious strife once and for all, also 
introduces a new antagonism, as the new enlightenment religion must 
struggle to overcome the unenlightened religions of old. Above all, Kant’s 
ethical kingdom of ends, which his rational universalism introduces as 
the rational substitute for the kingdom of God in the biblical vision of 
universality, emerges as a  highly inconsistent “form of politics rooted 
in morality and not politics as such, a  non-politics to counter worldly 
politics” (p. 115). Kant’s explanation of how the ethical commonwealth is 
to be brought about in a joint effort of human morality and divine grace, 
thus, remains elusive at best. 
Hermann Cohen, whose religious philosophy erlewine regards as 
the most promising of the three enlightenment approaches examined, 
chooses to retain the intolerance essential to elective monotheism, 
thus doing justice to the basic self-conception of monotheistic religion. 
However, Cohen’s is a humane notion of intolerance that rests upon the 
foundation of a  complex ethical hermeneutics of the Jewish holy writ. 
Seeking to bridge the fateful chasm between rational and scriptural 
universalism, he posits that, historically, the former originally inheres in 
and develops from the latter. His method is twofold: Firstly, he subscribes 
to Kant’s notion of a regulative ideal that, while never actually attained 
in the endless process of rational inquiry, guides our every scientific 
and philosophical effort. Secondly, the method of “correlation”, derived 
from and closely related to the regulative ideal of Kantian philosophy, 
fuses two concepts into a unity which affects the meaning of both and 
preserves their semantic distinctiveness at the same time. The idea of 
God, in Cohen’s systematic thought, is truth. As such, it constitutes the 
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core principle of reason that safeguards the dynamic correlation of the 
actual “is” and the possible “ought”, i.e. the scientific and the ethical 
realms, which, in turn, serves as the indispensable rational foundation 
of all moral endeavour. moreover, the very dynamic of the “ought” in the 
process of realization translates into the concept of human nature which 
is pivotal to Cohen’s enlightenment construal of rational religion. The 
regulative ideal for which both morality and religion strive is the totality 
of humankind conceived of in contradistinction from the egocentricities 
of particularity and the vested interests of plurality. It is here that religion 
and the philosopher’s own Jewish creed play a major role, as the religious 
rationality of Judaism in particular impresses upon formal rational ethics 
the crucial correlation between God and man, and that between human 
beings, as well as the dimension of the interpersonal and human suffering. 
like Kant’s rational religion, Cohen’s, thus, is chiefly practical. However, 
whereas Kant, for all his praise of Christianity, is wary of attributing to 
it a special historical role, Cohen, besides the correlations between God 
and man and that between human beings, holds to the correlation of 
God and his chosen people as well, thus preserving a key idea of elective 
monotheism. In the course of history, he posits, this latter correlation, 
which bears on the Jewish people’s historical ministry in spreading 
the monotheistic creed, decisively shapes the first and the second: 
Though tracing the history of a particular people, the Hebrew bible is 
instrumental in bringing about the moral ideal of universality, as the 
Jewish revelation, whose multiple historical phases amount to a gradual 
rationalization of ethical monotheism, leads mankind as a whole towards 
rational universalism. rather than being the incomprehensible divine 
being of scriptural universalism, the unique God of Israel’s historical 
monotheism, in his correlation with his chosen people, is conceived of 
as the highest ideal of practical reason, the unity of mankind. In that, the 
relation between God and humanity is, in fact, so close as to verge on 
identity, as dictated by Cohen’s logic of correlation: The God whom Israel 
worships in its biblical history is the foundation of man’s transcending his 
mere “is” towards a holy “ought”. In turn, the universality of mankind, for 
whose sake the Jewish people bears witness, is the only means whereby 
God becomes apparent in the world. 
It is to the credit of erlewine’s fine analysis that he rediscovers the 
systematic significance of enlightenment philosophy of religion in 
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general and a  frequently-neglected author of the much-maligned Neo-
Kantian school of thought in particular. Among the numerous merits 
of Cohen’s religious philosophy, the author shows, is the relative paucity 
of its metaphysical commitments, which sets it apart both from moses 
mendelssohn’s whole-scale leibnizean rationalism and Immanuel Kant’s 
equally complex practical metaphysics. All in all, erlewine’s searching 
analysis of key thinkers of the ongoing project of enlightenment is 
a fine example of the systematic significance that may accrue to careful 
studies of hitherto underappreciated representatives of enlightenment 
thought. Hence, while eventually revealing both mendelssohn and Kant’s 
approaches to be inconsistent or flawed, their analyses of the inherent 
problem of elective monotheism are shown to be highly apposite and 
paving the way for Cohen’s systematically valid philosophy of moral 
monotheism. 
